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USING AND MISUSING HISTORY

Suzanna Sherry

Laura Kalman. The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism. New
University Press, 1996. viii + 375 pp. Notes and index. $40.00.

Since Alfred Kelly coined the term "law-office history" in 1965,

been added-except ever-multiplying examples-to the perenni
about how lawyers and legal academics use history. Laura Ka
ing new book about legal scholarship is thus a welcome contr
field.

Kalman begins by tracing the history of legal scholarship sinc
The central conundrum the realists and their successors bequeath

liberals"-those who trust the courts to implement large-scale
was how to keep their faith after the death of Earl Warren
attacks from both the Left and the Right. The first four chapte
are an accessible and enjoyable romp through legal realism, th
school, the "law and" movement, hermeneutics, and the va

scholarly fads that have entranced law professors over the y
provides nice insights into the relationships between law an
plines and tries, although not always successfully, to relate
movements to legal liberalism and its travails. She is occasio
especially when attributing malevolent motives to legal libera

for example, that the crisis of legal liberalism in the 1980s migh
triggered partly by the fear of "male academic lawyers ... that t
women and people of color into their ranks challenged their con

schools" (p. 94).
This part of the book accomplishes several important goals. It
interesting and substantial history of modern legal scholarship.

not in the best position to assess this particular contribution
feeling a bit voyeuristic: I should disclose that my own work

quite prominently, to somewhat mixed reviews from Kalman.) K

good at this sort of history, and readers will come away

understanding of the content and derivation of, and interre

tween, the most important modern legal theories.
Even more important, however, is that Kalman's discussion of
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flow of legal liberalism provides a new and persuas
lawyers do history the way they do (that is, accord
badly). Kalman shows how legal liberalism-buffeted
political spectrum and riven by internal division"dead, a historical relic" (p. 131). And so legal libera
their salvation.

What they found there was civic republicanism. Kalman does a wonderful

job of explaining how civic republicanism satisfied all the needs of legal
liberals. It enabled them to fend off attacks from originalists on the right by

providing "alternative interpretations of the Founding" (p. 139). It complemented the growing interest in communitarianism that legal liberals were
borrowing from political theorists. It promised to reduce the increasing
polarization of the legal academy by allowing a synthesis between individual
rights and community bonds, especially once republicanism was purged of its
less desirable attributes such as sexism, authoritarianism, and racism. Kalman
charmingly describes this purging as an attempt "to create a kinder, gentler

republicanism" (p. 160). The synthesis between individuals and community
in turn offered a way out of the countermajoritarian dilemma that had

haunted legal liberals since the Warren Court. It is no wonder the
neorepublicans "possessed a missionary spirit" (p. 155).
But a religious mission is not the same as a historical one, and therein lies
the key to the sometimes strained relationships between lawyers and histori-

ans. As Kalman puts it, "historians ... favor context, change, and explanation," and lawyers "value text, continuity, and prescription" (p. 180). Historians "delight in recreating the past in all its strangeness" (p. 186). For lawyers,

however-especially neorepublicans on a mission-history is to be mined for
its usefulness, not explored for its own sake. Legal liberals needed republican-

ism as a tool in their war against conservative originalists, and could not
afford the ambiguities, contradictions, and occasional distasteful results
inherent in a truly historical approach to the Founders' thought. So, Kalman
explains, "historians entered the fray to police their territory" (p. 163). This
was not a difficult goal, for, as Kalman points out, "it is as easy to show that
lawyers' legal history is ahistorical as it is to shoot fish in a barrel" (p. 179).

Had Kalman's analysis stopped here, it would have contributed significantly to our understanding of legal liberalism. Perhaps her greatest insight,
however, is her recognition that this is not the end of the story. She quotes
Mark Tushnet that "it is not a lot of fun watching people shoot fish in barrels;
indeed, one sometimes begins to develop sympathy both for the fish, who are
doing the best they can in trying circumstances, and for their pursuers, who
are doing the only thing they know how to do" (pp. 179-80). Kalman does in
fact have great sympathy for both the lawyers and the historians, and seems
to wish that each had a little more sympathy for the other.
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She conveniently provides suggestions for deve
thy. There is a difference, Kalman suggests, b
'public history' for nonacademic audiences" (in

latter, while it should remain faithful to the goal

less sophisticated, less ambiguous, and more
should recognize that lawyers' legal history se

historians' legal history, and thus may not
Lawyers, on the other hand, must neverthel

becoming "more sensitive to the varieties of hist

She suggests a number of rules for responsible
ing that "the public historian's conclusion sh
scholar's" (p. 205). She offers as a cautionary e
historian Alice Kessler-Harris, whose own scho
testimony in a sex discrimination case.

One might generalize Kalman's sound advice t

ans: never let your politics get in the way of you

or academic. Indeed, the examples she gives of fa

cases where a scholar was tripped up by an ov
abuse) scholarship to achieve a particular poli
mentioned by Kalman, the current controvers
cist Martha Nussbaum's testimony in the suit
homosexual constitutional amendment is anot

testified that the Greeks did not disapprove of h
rily on her translation of the Greek description

While many experts give tolmema a negative con
"enormity" or "shameless act," she testified that

connation of "daring," and that "enormity" w
to help invalidate a mean-spirited law later h
United States Supreme Court-might have bee

were questionable. She supported her testimony b

edition of the authoritative Greek dictionary.
"enormity" among the definitions of tolmema

to use the older edition exclusively, it turns out t

recent edition in her own scholarly work. Even i

tolmema is more accurate than that of the lexico
trying to finese the problematic entry.'

In the end, though, it is not clear whether Kalm

historians to take her advice, because doing so
In a puzzling final chapter called "Trading Plac
historians are becoming more willing to accept
yers are becoming more critical of ahistoric
Founders' intent. One might expect Kalman t
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toward more responsible historical scholarship, but i

deplore it: she concludes the book by noting that "it wou

law professors desert the barricades just as academics in o

historians, begin to show signs of appreciating what legal

and wanting to help" (p. 246).
Perhaps she is merely troubled that lawyers have go
longer recognize the need for "public" legal history
note that "history can never do as much as law profe

Unfortunately, however, her criticism of the liberal retr

originalism is subject to misinterpretation. She se

originalism primarily as a powerful tool against conser
arguments over constitutional interpretation, she say
everyone" (p. 238). It is tempting, therefore, to read her
liberals' move away from originalism as inviting a p
voluminous and sometimes contradictory writings in s
the liberal position.

Would such an interpretation be misreading Kalma
thoughtful analysis in most of the book, I believe tha

herself advocates a careful, responsible, and pragmatist ap

a limited value in such arguments from history; she wou
distortions of Madison's ideas even in the service of legal

afraid she is expecting too much from most lawyers. S
what she recognizes as their most powerful weapon bu
tion. Lawyers are, by training, disinclined to hold th
lawyers on a quasi-religious mission are doubly likely
urging them to (mis)use history for all it is worth.

Despite this danger, however, Kalman's book will enl
and historians. She notes that lawyers and historians h

cross-purposes. Once historians scorned lawyers' attempts

merely to understand, history; now, Kalman suggests,
who are trying to be pragmatic, the law professors who

(p. 229). Thus, having slid past one another without mana

middle, they are still engaged in "their dialogue of th
might remedy this deafness and provoke a serious an
between historians and lawyers? I would suggest tha
Kalman's book. It might help them understand one ano
Suzanna Sherry, Law School, University of Minnesota, is

postmodernism and law (forthcoming from Oxford Universit

1. For a balanced and readable account of the whole controversy
"The Stand: Expert Witnesses and Ancient Mysteries in a Color
Franca (September/October 1996), at p. 35.
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